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ABSTRACT 
       
The Report of the Secretary-General ‘In larger freedom’ had set the agenda of the 
summit meeting of September 2005, which brought together all United Nations 
member states. The report has put forward a reform agenda for the United Nations. 
Both the Report of the Secretary-General and the Summit Outcome Document based 
their proposals for reform on an analysis of the consequences of changing dynamics 
of international politics, the nature of new and existing threats and an idea of how the 
international system should address these challenges. The agenda of the UN reform 
explains how the concept of sovereignty and the idea of collective security are 
evolving and the ways in which these concepts can be institutionalized within the 
current Charter system. The way the reports combine the reality of world politics with 
some bold ideals, both illuminates the way the international politics is evolving and 
ought to evolve. In this respect, the discussion of reform embodied in these 
documents has both realist and normative concerns. The argument of this thesis is 
that the theories of international politics are short of conceptualizing both aspects of 
reform process because they are either realist/rationalist or idealist/normative. To 
reconcile the consensus realized at the practical level with the controversy in the 
theoretical level, it is necessary to go beyond realist-idealist dichotomy. The aim of 
the thesis is to assert how the reform process at the United Nations can be 
conceptualized by E.H. Carr’s concept of “sound political thinking” which is derived 
from the relationship between realism and idealism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
Eylül 2005’te Birleşmiş Milletler’e üye ülkelerin biraraya geldiği zirvenin gündemini 
belirleyen Genel-Sekreter raporu dünyanın karşı karşıya kaldığı yeni tehditlere dair 
bir saptama yaparak BM reformu çerçevesinde geniş çaplı bir dizi öneri sundu. Bu 
zirvede temel ilkeler üzerinde bir görüşbirliğine varıldı. Genel Sekreter raporu ve zirve 
sonuç bildirgesinde uluslararası ilişkilerin nasıl olduğu ve nasıl olması gerektiğine dair 
birtakım tespitlerden yola çıkıldı. Bu bağlamda BM’de reform pratiğindeki 
tartışmalarda gerçekçi ve normatif kaygıların birlikte ele alındığı ve bu çerçevede bir 
dönüşüm öngörüldüğünü söyleyebiliriz. Bu tezin temel iddiası BM’de reform 
tartışmasında gelinen noktanın hem dünya politikasının gerçekliği üzerinde hem de 
dönüşümün hangi yöne doğru olması gerektiği üzerinde bir görüşbirliğinin var olduğu 
ve bu dönüşümü kuramsal açıdan anlayabilmek için gerçekçilik-idealizm ikiliğinin 
aşılması gerektiğidir. Bu uzlaşmayı sağlayan yaklaşım ise E. H. Carr’ın gerçekçilik-
idealizm ikiliği arasındaki ilişkiden türettiği “sağlıklı siyasi düşünce” kavramıdır. 
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      I 
INTRODUCTION: Consensus and Controversy 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to understand the reform process at the United Nations. 
In order to understand the reform at the UN, it is necessary to comprehend the reasons of the 
need for reform. There is an apparent need to reform the institution because the nature of the 
problems that the world faces today is different from those of the post-Second World War 
period. The UN was established with the aim of preventing interstate wars. Today, we are 
faced with challenges that cannot be solved with the established mechanisms of the UN. Thus 
we need to rebuild institutional mechanisms of the UN to adapt to the newly emerging 
realities of world politics. 
We also observe an apparent will to reform the institution among the world 
community. There is a consensus on the fundamentals of the reform process embodied in the 
Summit Outcome Document of the 2005 UN World Summit. This consensus has a dual 
structure that is influenced equally by realist and idealist streams of thought. The realist 
content of this document is based on an examination of the new threats and challenges that the 
world faces and lessons learned from the past failures of the UN. Moreover, the document 
evaluates changing dynamics of the international politics and endorses the evolution of the 
principles of national sovereignty and security. The idealist content of the consensus 
manifests itself in the idea that human rights, development and security are interconnected 
and mutually reinforcing issue areas. Thus, the consensus manifested in the document 
endorses a new concept of “sovereignty as responsibility” and a new concept of security as 
“human security”. The resultant reform agenda is built on these two core concepts, which has 
both realist and normative content. Therefore, in order to understand this process, we need a 
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theoretical approach capable of dealing with this two-dimensional nature of the UN-reform 
process.  
The problem is, however, mainstream theories of international relations do not present 
a theoretical framework capable of approaching the two facets of the reform process in the 
interrelated manner that they deserve. What I have in mind, in this respect, are particularly 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, on the “realistic” side, and David Held’s idea of a 
“Cosmopolitan Democracy” on the idealistic side. I argue that in their respective approaches 
to the study of international organizations in general and to the question of UN reform in 
particular, these approaches tend to emphasize one dimension over the other, and therefore 
fail to establish the much-needed dialogue between the idealistic and realistic perspectives. 
My argument is that the theoretical framework E. H. Carr introduces in the “Twenty Years’ 
Crisis” helps us to understand the normative and practical content of the reports in the 
interrelated manner that they deserve. My interpretation of Carr indicates a coherent blend of 
realism and utopianism with reference to his mostly overlooked use of the realist thought as a 
critical weapon to attack those who defend the status quo and his argument for as well as 
against utopianism.  
In this thesis I try to show how the will for reform at the United Nations, embodied in 
the reports of the Secretary-General and the High-level Panel, exemplifies what Carr calls 
“sound political thinking”. The agenda of the UN reform explains how the concept of 
sovereignty and the idea of collective security are evolving and the ways in which these 
concepts can be institutionalized within the current Charter system. The way the reports 
combine the reality of world politics with some bold ideals, both illuminates the way the 
international politics is evolving and ought to evolve. As Carr says “we must recognize that 
theory, as it develops out of practice and develops into practice, plays its own transforming 
role in the process” (1942: 19). The attempt to understand the current debates of reform in the 
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light of Carr’s theoretical framework can both help us to understand the profundity of Carr’s 
contribution to the theory of international politics and shed a light on the transformation of the 
international polity.  
The focus of this thesis is to a large extent theoretical, in line with the aim to formulate 
a theoretical framework capable of approaching the two dimensions of the politics of change. 
To understand the reform process at the UN and tangible proposals for reform at the 
institution, especially reform in the structure and working methods of the Security Council, is 
crucial however beyond the limits of this thesis.  
       
1.1. Outline of the Chapters 
 
The first chapter begins with explaining in detail the reasons brought the need to 
reform the UN, and how the consensus over the principles of the reform came about before 
and during the 2005 World Summit. In this regard, I will first touch upon the changing 
dynamics of world politics and how the agenda of reform is prepared in response to these 
changing dynamics. I explain the preparatory stages of the World Summit with reference to 
the reports that framed the agenda of the summit and how these reports – the Report of the 
Secretary General and the High-level Panel Report – reflect the dual nature of the reform 
process. Then, I go on to present an account of the current reform agenda embodied in the 
World Summit Outcome Document (2005) and the Report of the Secretary-General (2005) 
that set the agenda of the summit. I will discuss main areas of reform with reference to the 
change in the understanding of the key principles of the Charter and how the will for reform 
embodied in these documents are based on two concepts: “human security” and “sovereignty 
as responsibility”. The evolution of these concepts will be discussed because it was the 
outcome of this discussion, which produced the consensus on how the world society should 
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address the new threats and challenges. We will see how in this process, we observe both 
normative ideals and realistic assessment of the current state of international politics.  
The second chapter begins with an examination of the state of the art of the theories of 
international organizations in general and addresses the question of reform at the UN in 
particular. I discuss these theories in two main groups: on the one side realist/rationalist 
models and on the other idealist/normative models. Having different research questions and 
employing different methodologies, these theories are short of enabling us to conceptualize 
change in international politics and the reform process at work in the institutional settings. No 
single theory within these theoretical streams is able to offer a complete explanation of the 
variation in the case of UN reform.  The second part of the chapter is an attempt to develop a 
theoretical explanation for change in the institutional settings and current reform agenda at the 
UN. In this respect, I find it necessary to link realist and idealist lines of thought in the 
theories of international organizations. The theoretical framework Carr introduces as a third 
alternative to realism and idealism, what he calls ‘sound political thinking’ will be discussed 
in detail with reference to the increasing secondary literature on Carr’s “The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis”. 
 I argue that the current reform process at the UN can best be conceptualized through 
the perspective of Carr’s understanding of politics as a constant struggle between the two 
forces: realism and idealism. The dialectic relationship between the two reconciles the 
controversy between the consensus achieved at the practical level and the controversy in the 
theoretical debates. My argument is that one of the challenges that stand in the way of 
realizing the reform agenda are the tools themselves that we use for understanding the world. 
A bridge between the theory and practice of reform at the UN can be built by searching for 
possibilities for synthesis between these two lines of thought. This “third way” is a solution to 
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the controversy in the theoretical level to grasp both normative and positive aspects of both 
the current reform process and the evolution of international organizations. 
In the concluding chapter, I will try to show the key ideas that can be drawn from my 
study to the larger subject area of international organizations. I will try to explain the 
implications of my interpretation of the reform process at the UN and the theoretical 
framework I proposed to comprehend the politics of change.  
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II 
REFORM AT THE UNITED NATIONS: A CONSENSUS 
 
It has been 60 years since the Charter of the United Nations was signed. Since its 
inception in 1945 in the San Francisco Conference, the UN has continued to adapt to the 
challenges of a complex and changing world environment, growing from fifty-one members 
in 1945 to one hundred and ninety-one in 2004. In this process, the quest for reform has been 
an integral part of the history of the United Nations. Through the years, many governmental 
studies, independent commissions and scholars have produced proposals aimed at making the 
UN work better, modify its mandate and operate more efficiently. Successive Secretary-
Generals have offered their own reform agendas1. This being the case, since its inception in 
1945, the UN Charter has been amended only three times, once to enlarge the Security 
Council from its original eleven members to today’s fifteen, and twice to enlarge the 
Economic and Social Council, which at present has fifty-four members (GA Res. 1991A, GA 
Res. 1991B, GA Res. 2847). The infrequency of Charter amendment is understandable given 
the burdensome process provided for adopting them. Under Article 108 it requires a two-
thirds majority of the total membership and its ratification by the same majority including all 
the permanent members of the Security Council.  
The chapter will focus on the recent reform initiative of the Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan at the United Nations. The agenda for reform embodied in the Report of the Secretary-
General named “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all” 
has set the agenda of the UN World Summit of 2005. There is an apparent will to reform the 
UN manifested in the Summit Outcome Document2 of 2005 UN World Summit3. The 
                                                 
1 For an account of the major UN reforms see Edward C. Luck (2004), “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons 
from a history in progress”.  
2 2005 World Summit Outcome (U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1) is accepted in the sixteenth session General Assembly 
meeting as the Outcome Document of the summit at the UN Headquarters held from 14 to 16 September 2005.  
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outcome document and the reports of the Secretary-General and High-level Panel manifest a 
strong will for reforming the UN and offer substantial proposals in order to make the UN 
capable of responding to contemporary threats and challenges as well as making the 
institution more efficient in decision-making capacities thus enabling it to respond quickly in 
times of emergency.  
In this respect, first I start by a brief examination of the conditions that made the need 
for reform inevitable. Secondly, there will be concise background information of the 2005 
World Summit in which the will for reform was shaped. Third, I will move on to discuss the 
main concepts on which the international community has decided to build the reform initiative 
on. In that section I will outline the evolution of the concepts of security and sovereignty with 
reference to the reports of the Secretary General and the High-level Panel and the Summit 
outcome Document. Finally, I will try to show how the concept of “human security” became 
the central reference for the reform process at work at the UN. 
 
2.1. From the need for reform to the will to reform  
The history of international organization shows us that both the establishment and 
reform of the institutions were always a response to solve new problems that need to be 
solved with a collective effort. Claude identifies four prerequisites for the development of 
international organization. First two of them relate to existing conditions: the world must be 
divided into states which function as independent units, and a level of contact must exist 
between these states. The other requirements are “subjective”. States must develop a level of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 UN summit of September 2005 was also the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the organization. World 
leaders have come together in United Nations Headquarters in New York to review progress made since the 
United Nations Millennium Declaration. The agenda of 2005 summit however became more than an evaluation 
of the progress of Millennium Summit outcome and became a world summit on the future and the capacity of the 
UN itself. The crisis of confidence to the UN has culminated after American intervention in Iraq. In the face of 
strong opposition from world public opinion and most members of the UN Security Council, Americans became 
disillusioned with the UN because it did not support war in Iraq and the Europeans and others lost their 
confidence because the UN could not stop it.  
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awareness of the problems, which arise out of their coexistence, and perceive a need to create 
institutional arrangements and methods for regulating their relations with each other (1984: 
21). Thus, in order to have the proper conditions for the creation of an international 
organization, the world must be divided, interdependent, and be aware of the problems that 
they face and be determined to create a systematic solution to handle these problems. I argue 
that the same conditions also create the need to reform the international institutions and today 
these four prerequisites are satisfied. 
We live in a global and interdependent world. When one attempts to make a list of the 
threats and challenges that the world faces today, it becomes clear how they are all “threats 
without boundaries”4. Conflicts between and within states, nuclear, biological, chemical and 
biological weapons, terrorism, transnational organized crime, challenges to ensure basic 
health services and primary education, infectious disease surveillance, access to clean water 
and clean energy, eradication of poverty, and environmental degradation5, are all threats and 
challenges nation-states are unprepared and incapable of addressing individually. No state is 
capable of standing wholly alone because the nature of newly emerging and existing threats to 
international peace and security is transnational. The transnational nature of these problems 
makes it necessary to deal with them in a multilateral framework.  
However, the world is divided since the international system is based on the principle 
of the sovereign equality of nation-states and characterized by “anarchy”6 and the Charter of 
the United Nations reflects this principle. As such the UN is equipped to prevent interstate 
                                                 
4 “Threats without boundaries” is one of the chapter titles of the High-level Panel report (Report of the Secretary 
General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004: 19).   
5 These threats are the main findings of the High-level Panel report (2004) and the Millennium Report (2000).  
6 The relationship between sovereignty and anarchy works both ways. On the one hand we can say that the 
nature of the international system is anarchical because states do not recognize any superior authority above 
themselves, on the other hand, states insist on their sovereignty because the system is anarchic. The questions 
arising from this relationship is discussed in the literature by asking whether anarchy is real or imagined (Waltz 
1979, Bull 1977) and further evaluated under the agent-structure debate (Wendt 1987). In this thesis I follow 
Bartelson’s argument that “there is no need for an acceptance of the structuralist ontology or the solution to the 
agent-structure problem that derives from it” because the problem of change in international politics remains the 
same if we only “accept here a certain duality of structure as a provisional touchstone” (1995: 258-9).  
 8
wars with Security Council intervention. As the nature of threats changes since the UN was 
founded in 1945, the organization has to adopt itself to be able to address these newly 
emerging challenges, to provide the necessary international cooperation between states. The 
need for reform stems from the fact that the nature of the problems today demands different 
approaches. 
The world community is aware of the problems they face and are determined to find 
systematic solutions to these challenges as they agreed in the 2005 World Summit. The 
Summit Outcome Document reflects how the world community first deliberated on the threats 
and challenges that the world faces today and then reached a consensus over the need to 
address these challenges by reforming the UN. The dual nature of the politics of change at the 
UN lies here. One dimension of the process is that the reform agenda7 embodied in the reports 
is based on an examination of the evolution of the international politics. Other dimension lies 
                                                 
7 The Report of the Secretary-General was prepared to set the agenda of the World Summit which gathered the 
heads of state and government at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 10 to 16 September 2005. 
There were two main agendas put forward by the Secretary-General report. First, it was an attempt to evaluate 
the five-year progress on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration. (Millennium Declaration (2000) 
was the outcome document of the UN Millennium Assembly of 2000. The declaration puts forward a shared 
vision for the future of the world as well as medium-term goals with specified deadline and substantial 
development goals for achieving the vision. The declaration is one of the rare documents in the UN system that 
specifies verifiable quantitative measures of progress (Peterson, 2006: 139-140). It called for a global effort to 
achieve the Millennium development Goals by 2015.) In preparing his report Annan made use of the Millennium 
Project’s report “Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to achieve the Millennium Development Goals”. It 
is an evaluation of the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (MDGs, approved by 
national leaders at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, were a set of ambitious development goals calling for 
new efforts from both developed and developing states.) in the five years after their approval in the 2000 
summit.  
Secondly, Annan’s report has drawn upon the conclusions of an independent report, a product of the 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change appointed by the Secretary-General. It was specifically 
concerned with security issues. The panel presented their report, “A more secure world: our shared 
responsibility”, to the Secretary-General in December 2004.  The vision created by High-level Panel Report 
addresses the major threats to international peace and security and sets out a new vision of collective security. 
The Report of the High-level Panel made recommendations on many controversial and core issues regarding 
international security including defining terrorism, preventive use of force, humanitarian intervention, reforming 
the UN Human Rights Commission and reforming the Security Council.  
The members of the panel was appointed by the Secretary-General Kofi Annan with the task of addressing 
threats, challenges and change confronting the United Nations in the coming years. Former prime minister of 
Thailand, Anand Panyarachun, headed the panel. The other members came from Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, 
France, Ghana, India, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Uruguay. The overall composition reflected the composition of the Security Council by including people on the 
basis of the geographical distribution of the seat among regional groups, and also nationals of the five permanent 
members. 
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in the normative content of the process, which answers the question what the ultimate goal of 
the reform process will be. The resulting reform agenda is a balanced document between these 
two dimensions of the politics of change. 
The dual nature of the reform process is based on the fact that the Summit Outcome 
Document both evaluates the nature of the threats the world faces and at the same time 
represents a broad consensus over the ways in which the international polity ought to evolve. 
One can easily identify the practical content of the reform agenda that is to respond to the new 
threats and challenges that the world faces. Identification of these threats is one dimension of 
the reform process. Another dimension of the current politics of change at the UN is the 
normative content of the Summit Outcome Document and the reports that set the agenda for 
the summit. The reports not only explain how the institution will change and adapt itself but 
why the institutions should change in that direction.  
 
2.2. The nature of new threats and challenges 
In order to analyze how the reform process has been shaped as a response to the 
current reality and how that reality has been interpreted in the reports that shaped the agenda 
of the Summit we should examine the main findings of the reports and the Outcome 
Document.  
The problems of today are different from the ones that the founders of the UN tried to 
address. In this respect, both reports and the Summit Outcome Document argue for the UN’s 
need to reconfigure in order to address a world of transnational threats which nation-states are 
either unprepared or incapable of meeting. Poverty, conflict, terrorism, infectious diseases, 
environmental degradation and weapons proliferation, all represent threats that have emerged 
since the UN charter was adopted in 1945. The global character of these issues and the way 
they combine security, human rights and development explains why the UN must reinvent 
itself for the future.  
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The central findings of the report of the Secretary-General (2005) and the report of the 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) that frame the current reform 
initiative at the UN is that security, human rights and development are interlinked (2005: 10). 
Johanna Mandelson Forman, senior program officer for peace, security and human rights at 
the United Nations Foundation, considers this as a reaction to the security first approach of 
the 1990s, which sees security in its traditional understanding. Forman argues that the 
experience of UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Congo, East Timor, Haiti, Rwanda 
and Somalia for example, have made the international community aware that armed 
interventions alone are inadequate to restore security and development in failed states (2005). 
In line with that argument, the report argues that denial of human rights and poverty greatly 
increases the risk of instability and violence. Similarly, war and terrorism set back 
development.  Development, security and human rights reinforce each other (SG report 2005: 
5).  
In Annan’s words the relationship between security, human rights and development:  
 
... has only been strengthened in our era of rapid technological advances, 
increasing economic interdependence, globalization and dramatic geopolitical 
change. While poverty and denial of human rights may not be said to “cause” 
civil war, terrorism or organized crime, they all greatly increase the risk of 
instability and violence. Similarly, war and atrocities are far from the only 
reasons that countries are trapped in poverty, but they undoubtedly set back 
development. Again, catastrophic terrorism on one side of the globe, for 
example an attack against a major financial centre in a rich country, could affect 
the development prospects of millions on the other by causing a major 
economic downturn and plunging millions into poverty. And countries which 
are well governed and respect the human rights of their citizens are better placed 
to avoid the horrors of conflict and to overcome obstacles to development. (SG 
report 2005: 5-6) 
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Secretary-General’s report includes most of the key findings and proposals of the 
High-level Panel report, which focuses on security issues. It also focuses on the role of the 
UN in economic, social and environmental matters because an increasingly complex global 
polity requires similarly comprehensive international organizations. Both the High-level Panel 
report (2004: 15) and the Report of the Secretary-General (2005: 16-18) have a broad 
conceptualization of security arguing that traditional understanding of security, defined as 
state’s defense of their territorial borders is not enough to grasp the meaning of security in the 
current era because security has social, economic, environmental and humanitarian aspects. 
Since World War II, the authority of states has been increasingly compromised by 
their participation in international institutions such as the United Nations but at the same time 
the UN enshrines the sovereignty of member states. Indeed, admission to the UN is the 
highest indication that a regime is accepted within the community of nations. A sovereign 
state is guaranteed exclusive jurisdiction within its borders and other states are not supposed 
to intervene in its internal affairs. Two core values of the UN Charter, sovereign equality of 
member states and respect for human rights, are in an uneasy relationship because human 
right abuser states set barriers by using the traditional understanding of sovereignty. 
Furthermore, states which are not capable of providing a secure environment and prospect for 
development for their citizens are also entitled to full sovereignty over their territory without 
being able to offer the most fundamental duties of a state. In this respect, the concept of 
“sovereignty as responsibility” implies that state authorities are not only responsible for the 
safety and lives of citizens but also promotion of their welfare. It suggests that the national 
political authorities are responsible to their citizens internally and to the international 
community externally. Thus, sovereignty becomes no longer only a right but also a 
responsibility because the state has an instrumental value. State has the rights of sovereignty 
as long as it fulfills the duties stemming from it. As a consequence of the understanding of 
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“sovereignty as responsibility” states become obliged not only to protect their own citizens 
but also to fulfill its duties to the wider international community. This obligates other states in 
the system to act if a state does not fulfill its basic obligations, such as to provide security to 
its citizens. 
 
2.3. Main Conceptual Changes in the Current Reform Initiative  
 
at the United Nations 
 
 These reports are not only addressing how the UN can be the central medium of the 
coming world order, they provide a blueprint for how the new world order should be built. 
They focus on the fundamental principles of international politics and how the new 
international order would be legitimized. They also analyze the events and trends in world 
politics since the end of Cold War and the implications of these events and trends on the 
coming order. The centrality of the “human security” and “sovereignty as responsibility” can 
be understood within this perspective. This concept frames the vision of these reports for the 
coming world order. In order to understand the will for reform embodied in these reports I 
think it is necessary to examine the evolution of these concepts in more detail.  
The broad principles of the Charter are capable of addressing these new threats and 
challenges. Among these principal aims of the Charter, economic and social development and 
protection of human rights which were seen as secondary to and separate from the objective 
of maintenance of international security. Traditional notions of security were concerned 
mainly with the state’s ability to counter external threats. As the nature of threats change, 
from inter-state war to internal conflict, with the decrease in the capacity of the state to 
provide basic security, health and education services to its citizen, the concept of security has 
began to evolve to include human elements of security such as “human rights, good 
governance, access to education and health care, and ensuring that each individual has 
opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potential” (Report of the Commission on 
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Human Security 2003: 4). As the definition of security has broadened to include not only 
peace between states but also the security of populations within states, the interpretation and 
implementation of these basic Charter principles gained importance. As a result, the 
consensus embodied in the Summit Outcome Document refers to these Charter principles and 
reinterprets them in the contemporary context.  
 
2.3.1. Human Security  
The concept of security today must shift its emphasis from state to individuals. This 
argument leads the way to a new definition of sovereignty as well. The idea of state 
sovereignty, which is at the core of the UN system, is also evolving from a focus of rights of 
states to the duties of states stemming from sovereignty. Among the most recent evolutions 
was the changing focus from national security to the inclusion of “human security” within the 
state. The notion of state sovereignty is beginning to evolve to include the responsibility of 
the state to protect its citizens, not just the immunity of the state from interference. The panel 
report argues that to realize its principal aim, the protection of state security, the concept of 
security should be redefined so as to include human security aspect as well. The concept of 
“human security” should be at the core of the new collective security system that the panel 
report intends to establish (2004: 22-24). 
The “new security consensus”8 that the panel proposes is based on a number of 
common threats, some old, some new. The panel identifies the threats as including “poverty, 
infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread 
and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and 
transnational organized crime.” (Panel report, Synopsis, at 11). The threat assessment 
embodied here is at the core of the concept of “human security”. Slaughter identifies the 
                                                 
8 The High-level Panel report’s first part is titled “Towards a New Security Consensus”. 
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entrance of the concept of “human security” to use in the official language dating back to 
early 1990s. The Canadian government9 started to promote and use the concept and later Kofi 
Annan endorsed the idea in the “We the Peoples” report10 (2005:623).  
It is interesting that the Panel Report refers back to the drafters of the UN Charter 
arguing that they endorsed the idea of “human security” long before the idea gained 
momentum by stating in the opening words of the Charter that security, economic 
development and human freedom are interlinked (Panel Report, supra note 1, Synopsis, at 
11). This linkage of “human security” to state security can be made with reference to the 
Charter to the extent that “the drafters of the Charter would have identified only scourges such 
as poverty and disease as threats to the extent that they directly threatened territorial integrity 
or political independence of individual states” (Slaughter 2005: 623). Thus, one can link state 
security to “human security” by arguing that today poverty and disease are important factors 
contributing to state collapse, and the problem of failed states not only threatens their region 
but also creates a security threat to the world by being safe haven for terrorists.  
The panel report does not see these threats as being directly related to state security 
because they threaten regional or world security. These threats are regarded as a security issue 
because they threaten the lives of citizens within states. This line of argument has more 
implications than the panel report openly discusses. In order to “put human security alongside 
or even before state security”, some core values of the Charter becomes controversial, above 
all, the idea of sovereignty (Slaughter 2005: 624). The challenge posed by the interrelated 
threats and the ineffectiveness of states to respond these common threats by themselves calls 
for a redefinition of the very concept of sovereignty and some core values embedded in the 
Charter such as the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states (Keohane 
                                                 
9 The concept used by the former foreign minister of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy (1997: 183) from early 1990s on. 
10 Annan in his millennial “We the Peoples” report underlined the need for more human-centered approach to 
security (2000).  
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1993: 91-2). “Human security” has already started to become a matter of collective security 
exemplified by the Security Council decisions taken throughout the 1990s. Security Council 
decision called the starvation in Somalia and Massacre in East Timor threats to international 
peace and security that requires collective action11 (Slaughter 2005: 624). In this respect, one 
can argue that states, taking these measures through Security Council decisions, no longer 
perceive the idea of sovereignty to be absolute as it was in the ideal of the Westphalia treaty12.  
The problems associated with this trend of intervening in the affairs of other states are 
twofold. First, some states feel threatened by this newly developing concept of “human 
security” because they think the concept will be operationalized as long as it serves to the 
interest of the big powers. Second, the concept of “human security” has implications for the 
developed countries, to step in to protect the victims from human rights violator governments. 
In fact, the idea that powerful states have a responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security has a long tradition dating back to the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna, 
with the advance of the concept of “human security” now the “responsibility to protect” 
started to have a more comprehensive meaning than in the past. The panel envisions a 
collective responsibility and commitment to address threats to both human and state security. 
Slaughter identifies this as collective security system, which the Charter does not foresee, 
namely a system “based on a positive pledge of affirmative assistance rather than a negative 
commitment to refrain from the use of force against fellow states” (2005: 625).  
The mechanism for such an action the panel foresees is the one that the Charter 
frames: 
                                                 
11 There are a number of similar trends such as accountability of individual leaders for their actions against their 
own citizens. Justifications for interference in the affairs of other states are increasingly based on the human 
rights and other problem arising from the so called failed states, see (Slaughter 2005) 
12 The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648 ending the Eighty Years’ War, marked the beginning of the modern 
state system in Europe. The treaty introduced the principle of sovereignty of nation-states and defined 
sovereignty tied to the right of self-determination, sovereign equality of states and the principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of states as guiding principles of interstate relations.  
 16
 Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations 
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice 
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII” (The Charter of 
the United Nations, Article 2(7)).   
 
However the Charter prohibits intervening in the affairs of member states, the panel 
may well build its claim on the articles of the Chapter VII which gives the framework of 
Security Council authorized measures. To conclude, panel sees the responsibility to protect 
the “human security” and state security on the issues relating to internal affairs of the states 
can be legal as long as the Security Council authorizes the decision. Although this seems like 
a challenge to the principle of state sovereignty which is one of the core values of the UN 
Charter, a deeper analysis of the debates over the legitimacy and legality of the use of force 
in the framework of the recent UN reform agenda would illuminate the seeming controversy. 
 
2.3.2. Use of force 
One of the most controversial problems of international politics is the question when 
and under which circumstances the use of force would be considered just. This question is 
also addressed in the reports of the Secretary-General and the High-level Panel. In this 
respect, the panel reaffirms the right of states to defend themselves, even preemptively when 
an attack is imminent. One of the objectives of the panel was to deal with the issue of 
preventive uses of force. Especially after the ineffectiveness of the UN in Rwanda, Kosovo 
and Iraq cases, it become evident that the decision making process at the Council was too 
slow, because the decision was blocked by veto or led to a significant divide between the 
members of the council. In addressing the challenge posed by the increase in the number of 
threats that calls for preventive measures the panel proposes the use of preventive measures 
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before the threat becomes imminent (Panel report, supra note 1, at 55, para. 194). The panel 
sees the source of legitimacy of such preventive measures at the Security Council and does 
not envisage a change in the Article 51, right to self-defense provisions of the Charter. The 
panel report does not support the arguments in favor of using Article 51 provisions for 
justifying preventive measures. It is up to the Security Council to decide if the preventive use 
of force can be employed in each case (Panel report, supra note 1, at 55, paras. 190-2).  
The panel recommended the Security Council to agree on a set of guidelines that 
would guide their decisions for answering whether the force should be used (Panel report, 57, 
para. 205). The panel puts forward five criteria of legitimacy: seriousness of threat, proper 
purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences (Panel report, 57, para. 
207).  
Eventhough the panel report limits the case for legality and legitimacy of military 
intervention, there can be cases like the NATO intervention in Kosovo where the Security 
Council being bypassed did not effect the legitimacy it had in the eyes of the world public 
opinion. The Kosovo Commission found the act “illegal but legitimate” (Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo 2000, The Kosovo report). Thus, in such cases even if 
the Security Council is bypassed, the act to intervene can be seen legitimate. What the panel 
offers in terms of legitimacy – five criteria of legitimacy – set the rules that the Security 
Council itself will apply. In this respect, the Security Council will become both the place that 
decides the legality and legitimacy.  
However positive it may seem that these criteria will set the guidelines for legitimate 
decisions, there are a number problems associated with it. It can cause further inability to act 
by the Council, “giving members five new criteria to argue about while Rome, or Rwanda, or 
Darfur, burns” (Slaughter 2005: 626). Slaughter sees this effort to outline the guidelines for 
legitimacy test as an attempt to moderate the emphasis on proactive measures and prevention 
 18
(2005: 626). Early and preventive action on issues from disease, hunger and environmental 
degradation to systematic human rights violations and terrorism will be routed through the 
Security Council. The panel’s call for extra caution on the decision-making measures on these 
matters is understandable since the world is witnessing the consequences of actions that is not 
envisioning through others’ eyes. 
The decision at hand will be both legal and legitimate if these criteria will be 
operationalized however, the argument on the part of the Council that they reached the 
decision by using these legitimacy criteria may not be enough to make the world public 
opinion see the decision as legitimate. The legality of the Security Council authorized action 
does not guarantee their legitimacy in the eyes of the world public opinion. That is why, the 
panel argues for a Security Council reform as well, for making it both more representative and 
also calls for the need for the Security Council to be more proactive and effective.   
Regarding the Security Council reform, Mr. Annan left it to the General Assembly to 
decide between basic ideas proposed in November by the High-level Panel. He urged the 
governments to reach a decision before the September meeting. The council now has five 
veto-bearing members – Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States – and ten 
members elected to two-year terms. Panel’s report recommends an increase of the members to 
make the council more representative to reflect modern realities of global power. The current 
disposition of the Security Council, which institutionalizes the inequality of power, will 
continue even if the proposed reforms at the Council will take place. However, a more 
representative Security Council will both be more able to isolate one veto-wielding state to act 
against the world public opinion and also be more able to claim legitimacy to its decisions in 
general.  
In July 2005, the UN General Assembly deliberated on the issue of enlargement of the 
Security Council. As a result three draft resolutions were submitted. The first draft was calling 
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for the adoption of the Model A (one of the two models proposed by the High-level Panel, 
2004: 81-3). Only departure was the addition of four new permanent members instead of the 
proposed three, thus making the Council membership twenty-five. This draft has been put 
forward by the so-called G-413 understandable as the Model A includes the suggestion to add 
six new permanent seats. Second draft resolution put forward by the African Union, proposing 
in addition to what G-4 supported enlargement one more additional non-permanent seat. Last 
proposal, backed by a group of states calling themselves “United by Consensus”14, offers what 
Model B of the High-level Panel includes, ten new non-permanent seats. Since none of these 
drafts has the chance to gather the two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, G-4 and the 
African Union decide to harmonize their proposals.  
Before the UN summit of 2005, the concern of both the Panel members and the 
president of the General Assembly was that the controversies over the reform of the Security 
Council could abort UN reform altogether. The president of the General Assembly submitted 
his own report on UN reform, in which he skipped the issue of the Council’s enlargement and 
called the member states to concentrate on other central issues such as development assistance 
and nation building (Pisik 2005). Those concerns were well grounded since the UN summit of 
September 2005 ended with no agreement on the issue of the Security Council debate 
(Heinlein, 2005).  
The discussion over the use of preventive force has been decided by indicating that it 
is up to the Security Council to call for an action evaluating each case with given criteria of 
legitimacy and under the current Charter. There is no need for a change in the Charter 
provisions regulating use of force because these provisions are broad enough to be interpreted 
                                                 
13 The so-called G-4 countries, Germany, Japan, Brazil and India launched a joint effort for permanent seats on 
the UN Security Council in September 2004 (DW-World DE Deutche Welle, 22.9.2004) 
14 Opposing the G-4, the group “United for Consensus” is co-sponsored by Argentina, Canada, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, San Marino, South Korea, Spain and Turkey. China has 
also put its backing behind the group strongly opposing the possible permanent seat of Japan in the 
Council. 
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in the direction that the concept of “human security” and changing understanding of 
sovereignty is calling for. 
 
2.3.3. Redefinition of Sovereignty 
The principle of state sovereignty is regarded as overwhelming and unconditional in 
international law for a long time. The Nuremberg trials of 1945, which made individuals 
directly accountable in international criminal law, were the first challenge against this state-
centric tradition. The recognition of binding individuals with international duties led to the 
recognition of individual human rights as well. This process has been codified right after the 
Second World War, with the Genocide Convention, the Geneva conventions and their 
additional protocols, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, two UN International 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
 With the adoption of the Charter, the principle of state sovereignty and respect for 
human rights has been integrated at the United Nations establishing promotion of respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. However, protection of human rights was not 
one of the principal concerns of the UN Security Council during the Cold War. The Security 
Council authorized sanction only in a few cases during this period15.  With the end of Cold 
War, the role of the UN in human rights protection has revived. The Security Council has 
qualified many situations as threats to peace in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, 
Haiti, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone and Sudan. In these cases the Security Council 
opened the way to legally justified prospects for intervention. However in three other 
                                                 
15 In 1950, the UN Security Council authorized UN members to intervene and restore the sovereignty of the 
Republic of Congo against a secessionist movement. In that case the authority of the Council is applied to a non-
international conflict. In another case, the Council imposed sanctions against the racist regimes in southern 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa, which is considered as a major development of its powers from 
defending state sovereignty to defending human rights (Popovski 2004).  
 21
examples, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, coalitions, not authorized by the Security Council, 
intervened militarily in sovereign states.  
All of these instances had different motivations and different levels of legitimacy but 
united by being a challenge to the concept of absolute state sovereignty and the principle of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. This accumulation of precedents has started 
to change the concept of sovereignty. Now, “a state cannot pretend absolute sovereignty 
without demonstrating a duty to protect people’s rights” (Popovski 2004: 2). It is becoming to 
be accepted that when governments fail to protect human rights or in cases they engage in 
policies leading to crimes against humanity, the international community can intervene by 
using extraterritorial duty to protect people at risk16.  
The reports of the High-level Panel and the Secretary General support a modern 
concept of sovereignty that involves a duty to protect human rights. In the paragraphs 29 and 
30, the Panel report reinterprets the concept of sovereignty in a way that has crucial 
repercussions. The report argues that sovereignty gives responsibilities to states as well as 
privileges: 
 
 
In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit from the 
privileges of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities. Whatever 
perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to 
the notion of State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a 
State to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the 
wider international community. But history teaches us all too clearly that it 
cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its 
responsibilities to protect its own people and avoid harming its neighbours. And 
in those circumstances, the principles of collective security mean that some 
portion of those responsibilities should be taken up by the international 
community, acting in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to help build the necessary capacity or 
supply the necessary protection, as the case may be. (Panel report pg. 17, para. 
29). 
                                                 
16 The redefinition of the sovereignty to include the responsibility to protect human rights has also went hand in 
hand with codification of individual accountability for international crimes in 1990s.  
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This redefinition of sovereignty has its roots in the ICISS17. The ICISS report as 
reflected in its title “The Responsibility to Protect”, puts forward the idea that “sovereign 
states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from 
mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, 
that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states” (2001: viii).  
Sovereign equality of states is one of the cornerstones of the United Nations Charter 
as outlined in the Article 2.1. The norm of non-intervention is again a cornerstone of the 
Charter enshrined in Article 2.7. A sovereign state has exclusive and total jurisdiction over its 
territorial borders under international law. Other states have the duty not to intervene in the 
internal affairs of the sovereign state. Throughout the twentieth century many examples of 
intervention in the internal affairs of other states have taken place however this practice did 
not led to an abandonment of the norm of non-intervention (ICISS report 2001: 12). As the 
ICISS report has remarked, “the UN was therefore the main arena for the jealous protection, 
not the causal abrogation, of state sovereignty” (2001: 13).  
However the traditional understanding of sovereignty can be seen as a challenge for 
the idea of the responsibility to protect, as the Panel report underlines “the Charter of the 
United Nations seeks to protect all States, not because they are intrinsically good but because 
they are necessary to achieve dignity, justice, worth and safety of their citizens” (Panel report 
pg. 17, para. 30). The Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in his own words how the 
dilemma between the state centric approach to sovereignty and individual sovereignty as 
                                                 
17 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has released its report “The 
Responsibility to Protect” on December 2001. The main aim of the report was to address the issue of the right of 
humanitarian intervention. In response to the call of Kofi Annan (2000) for trying to forge unity on the issue of 
humanitarian intervention, Government of Canada, together with a group of other foundations established this 
commission. The report is a product of the work of the twelve commissioners of the ICISS.   
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embodied in the concept of “human security” forces us to reconsider the concept of 
sovereignty. He said, 
 
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the 
forces of globalization and international co-operation. States are now widely 
understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. 
At the same time individual sovereignty—by which I mean the fundamental 
freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent 
international treaties—has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading 
consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are 
more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not 
to protect those who abuse them (1999).  
 
 
This line of thinking which combines the idea of individual sovereignty with a 
commitment to the Charter provisions on sovereignty has found its results in both the ICISS 
report and the Panel report. What ICISS report did was to conceptualize the term “sovereignty 
as responsibility” as against sovereignty as control (ICISS report 2001: 13). And as Annan 
underlined and the panel also endorsed that this change is compatible with the fundamental 
values enshrined in the UN Charter. The organizing principle of the UN sovereign equality is 
not challenged by this new interpretation of the Charter because as Slaughter argues nations 
are free to choose to sign or not to sign the Charter, however they must accept by signing it, 
they have to accept the responsibilities of membership. One of these responsibilities is to 
provide the security - as understood as human security not state security - for its citizens. It is 
actually the fundamental duty of any state. If a state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this duty, 
the claim of sovereignty does not apply. This understanding of sovereignty is named as 
conditional sovereignty by Slaughter (2005: 628), which obligates states not only to protect its 
own citizens but also fulfill its duties to the wider international community (Panel report pg. 
17, para. 29). This obligates states to act if a state does not fulfill its basic obligations to 
provide security to its citizens.  
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As a consequence of this reinterpretation of sovereignty, and new interpretation of the 
duties stemming from the Charter, membership to the UN is no longer signifies a validation 
and protection of the sovereign status of states. The transformation of the concept of 
sovereignty embodied in Panel report can be seen as a response to the actual transformation of 
the nature of international politics.  
Concepts of “human security” and “sovereignty as responsibility” being at the core, 
the world leaders deliberated over the reform agenda put forward by the reports of the 
Secretary-General and High-level Panel and built a consensus over the future of the UN at the 
World Summit. Shaped by these two concepts, Summit Outcome Document decides on a 
number of key issues regarding the future of the international polity and role of the UN in it. 
 
2.4. World Summit Outcome 
The High-level Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (the 2005 
World Summit) took place in New York, from 14 to 16 September. The summit has brought 
together an unprecedented number of – one hundred ninety one - heads of states. The summit 
was seen as a unique opportunity for UN member states to take decisive action to address 
some of the most important issues before the international community, including reducing 
poverty, strengthening collective security, and enhancing the protection of human rights. In 
addition to reviewing the implementation of the Millennium declaration and overcoming the 
obstacles before realizing MDGs by the target date of 2015, governments attending the 
summit had the opportunity to discuss the much-needed reform at the UN. Governments had 
the chance to consider the recommendations put forward by the Secretary-General in his 
report. In this part, I will examine how the changing concepts of security and sovereignty 
resonated in the summit outcome document and shaped the decisions over institutional 
restructuring of the UN.  
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World summit outcome document, despite all the disappointments on the part of the 
issues such as the Security Council reform, and provisions on the use of force, was a 
surprising display of unity of the world community on a number of issues. The document 
contains decisions on strengthening the UN in the field of peace maintenance, peacekeeping 
and peace building, including a detailed scheme of creation of a new commission on peace 
building. It condemns unconditionally by all members-states, for the first time in the history 
of the United Nations, the terrorism "in all its forms and displays whoever, wherever and with 
whatever goals is carrying it out", and also includes an urgent call to finish the elaboration of 
a Universal Convention on terrorism within 12 months and an arrangement on working out of 
global strategy to fight terrorism. Unfortunately, it was not possible yet to come to consent on 
defining the term "terrorism" (Summit outcome, 2005: 23). It is expected that the problem 
could be solved within the framework of elaboration of the Comprehensive Convention on 
struggle against international terrorism (Daulian, 2005). In fact, Secretary-General has just 
issued a report as a follow-up to the outcome of the 2005 World summit, “Uniting against 
Terrorism” on the May 2nd, 2006 that presented recommendations for a global counter-
terrorism strategy.  
One of the main proposals is to restructure the discredited Human Rights Commission 
to keep rights violators from becoming members and redefine terrorism to end any 
justifications of its use for national resistance. In his report, Annan recommended replacing 
the 53-nation Human Rights Commission with a smaller council, whose members would be 
chosen by a two-thirds vote of the 191-nation General Assembly, rather than by regional 
groups.  
The idea of creation of a UN Council on Human Rights as replacement of the present 
Commission is approved. The mandate and modalities of work of this new body are defined 
right after the summit and new members has been elected (G.A. Res. 60/251). Fast pace of 
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development over the implementation of the creation of the Human Rights Commission is 
followed on the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (G.A. Res. 60/180).  
Commitments of donors, as well as of developing countries are fixed with regard to 
the measures that are needed for achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. 
Provisions on creation of the world system of early warning on natural calamities, on 
mobilization of new resources to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria are included. Also 
problems of counteracting organized crime, corruption and drug trafficking have not remained 
without attention18.  
Most important decision in the outcome document was the one discusses the “human 
security” concept in one separate paragraph, not attaching it the section named 
“Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity” where the concept of responsibility to protect is outlined (Summit outcome 
2005: 31-2). Even without voicing up too much19, the outcome document summarizes the 
basic arguments of the High-level panel and the ICISS report on the responsibility to protect. 
Even if it is a positive account that the outcome document argues that “each state has the 
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity”, it is very limited compared to the “human security” concept the 
High-level panel endorses which includes threat from poverty and infectious disease to human 
rights abuses and terrorism.20 However, the link that the High-level panel made between 
sovereignty and responsibility remains intact, as each state declared that all of them are 
responsible to protect their own populations and if they fail to do so the international 
community “is prepared” to take the necessary measures.   
                                                 
18 Progress on the UN reform based commitments of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document is under 
constant review, for the most recent updates please see <http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php/eupdate/2270>. 
19 Lynch (2005) stated that it was due to U.S. pressure that the agreement removed the call to permanent 
members of the Security Council “to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity” (Revised Draft Outcome Document 2005: 120).  
20 A brief summary of the how High-level Panel report defines the concept of human security is outlined on pg. 
6. For more please see Report of the High-level Panel 2005: 9-19. 
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The Outcome Document represents a consensus over the fundamentals of this reform 
referring to the concepts of “human security” and “sovereignty as responsibility”. 
Redefinition of two core concepts, security and sovereignty, has significant implications for 
the conduct of international politics. The Summit Outcome Document endorsed these two 
concepts “human security” and “sovereignty as responsibility”. In the ninth paragraph of the 
resolution, the world leaders declared they “recognize that development, peace and security 
and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing”. The outcome document endorses 
the idea in a separate paragraph titled “human security” by stating  
 
We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and 
despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are 
entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity 
to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we 
commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the 
General Assembly. (World Summit Outcome 2005: 2, 32) 
 
 
 
In the section titled “Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” the Outcome Document states that “each 
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” The agreement continues to argue for the 
responsibility of the international community to act through the UN to help protect 
populations by using appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means. If 
peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities manifestly failing to protect its citizen, 
the resolution calls for taking collective action under Chapter VII of the Charter. (World 
Summit Outcome 2005: 31-2) 
The central massage of the document is that security, human rights and development 
are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. This relationship results a shift in the understanding 
of security and a reinterpretation of sovereignty. The new security understanding goes beyond 
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the traditional concept of state security towards what is called “human security”. The concept 
of “human security” complements state security, understood as state’s monopoly on the rights 
and means to protect its citizens, in a way that enhances human rights and strengthens human 
development. These ideas have been set out in recent discussions of security and declared 
through the reports on the “Sovereignty as Responsibility” and “Human Security”21.  
The agreement broadens the concept of “international peace and security” that 
underlies Chapter VII of the UN Charter and implies that even if the consent of the nation 
concerned is not taken, a Chapter VII action can be justified in the name of regional security. 
And it does so, as the High-level panel offers, without a need to amend the Charter, with a 
reinterpretation of the fundamentals of the founding document. As Ian Williams has 
expressively worded “in reality, it is not the Charter that needs reform – but what use the 
member states put it to” (2005). 
When we think that the motivation behind the agreement is the organization’s past 
inaction in Darfur, Sudan and Rwanda, it is important to outline the scope of possible 
unilateral action for future humanitarian intervention. Alicia Bannon, interpreting the summit 
agreement, argues that “the Summit agreement strengthens the legal justification for limited 
forms of unilateral and regional action, including military action, if the United Nations fails to 
act to protect population from genocide and other atrocities” (2006: 1158). The agreement 
supports unilateral action in a very narrow way that is limited to extreme human rights abuses 
and allows for unilateral action only in U.N. inaction, if the peaceful measures do not resolve 
the matter. The Summit agreement codifies the recent trend in international law and 
strengthens the development of a new international norm regarding humanitarian protection 
(Bannon 2006: 1158). A clear understanding is fixed by all UN members of a collective duty 
to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansings and crimes against humanity. 
                                                 
21 For more on these concepts please see ICISS (2001) report “The Responsibility to Protect”, Report of the 
Commission on Human Security (2003), “Human Security now” and Axworthy (2001) “Human Security and 
Global Governance”.  
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The Millennium Declaration’s call for the eradication of poverty, access to clean 
water, sanitation, and access to clean energy sources is also seen as an example of the new 
emphasis on “human security” (Krasno, 2004a: 3). In this respect, the report reinforces this 
idea and calls for taking the necessary measures that would realize the Millennium 
Development Goals by 2015. In order to reach that aim Annan urges the governments of each 
developing country to strengthen governance, to combat corruption and adopt transparent, 
credible and properly costed development strategies by 2006. He also urges the developed 
countries to establish timetables to achieve the 0.7 per cent target of gross national income for 
official development assistance by 2015.  
The report also calls for and offer strategies for promoting gender equality, achieve 
universal primary education, eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, investing in better 
resource management for the environment, increasing food output and incomes, promoting 
jobs, upgrading slums, ensuring universal access to essential health services, debt relief, 
ensuring environmental sustainability, infectious disease surveillance, preventing catastrophic 
terrorism, organized crime, nuclear, biologic and chemical weapons, strategies for war 
prevention,  and monitoring, migration, regulation of small arms, light weapons and 
landmines. 
During the negotiations for the draft outcome document of the world summit, 
Amnesty International, OXFAM, Human Rights Watch and the Global Call to Action Against 
Poverty issued a joint press release on September 5, 2005, and called the attempt to include 
“responsibility to protect civilians from genocide and grave human rights abuses” in the 
summit outcome document as a historic opportunity. They named the document as a historic 
draft measure that would urge the governments to take measures to prevent genocide (Joint 
press release of Sept. 5, 2005). The final document, passed as a resolution from the General 
Assembly as the 2005 World Summit Outcome, endorsed the idea of responsibility to protect 
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by stating under the heading “Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” in paragraphs 138 and 139:  
 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, 
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and 
will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as 
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and 
support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
 
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely 
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation 
with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We 
stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind 
the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit 
ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before 
crises and conflicts break out. (World Summit Outcome 2005: 31) 
 
 
These two paragraphs are the signs of the beginning of the institutionalization process 
of the idea of responsibility to protect from being a landmark General Assembly resolution to 
an international norm, and to international law and institutional enforcement mechanisms 
under the law. Built on the “human security” and “sovereignty as responsibility” concepts, 
which are beginning to be accepted by the international community, “responsibility to 
protect” is an important achievement for the future of world politics. Built on this 
achievement, on the 28th of April 2006, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Resolution contains the historic first 
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official Security Council reference to the responsibility to protect: it “reaffirms the provisions 
of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document regarding the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity” (S. C. Res. 1674). The repercussions of the adoption of the idea of 
responsibility to protect in the General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions are 
unknown. However, the endorsement in the Summit Outcome was a great achievement in the 
way of codifying this principle and making it a regular feature of international law. 
Edward C. Luck, in his conclusion to the review of history of reform at the UN, 
argues that change does not come easily in the UN system however the process of reform is 
constant. He also underlines the fact that the course of reform tends to be unpredictable. A 
reform rarely ends up in the way its initiators had expected (2004: 389-90). The reform may 
sometimes take place during implementation, not at the negotiating table. Thus, the fact that 
only a number of small steps towards making the UN more accountable have been 
accomplished in the September 2005 summit does not necessarily mean that the will 
embodied in these reports cannot be realized. The consensus reached over the two concepts 
will continue to shape future reform processes at the UN and the evolution of international 
polity. 
 
2.5. The Challenge Ahead 
 Claude argues that “if international organization is a process; international 
organizations are representative aspects of the phase which has been reached at a given time.” 
(1984: 4) In this sense, we can interpret the current structure of the UN as a ‘phase’ in the 
process of the international organization. Within this process, in order to realize the current 
will for reform reflected in the reports in the short term, or different ideals for reforming 
international politics with the aim of limiting the role of power in the long term, first, we need 
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to identify the challenges on the road. The realistic aspect of the reform process lies in the fact 
that  “international organizations are never simply the product of creative planning and 
institutional evolution; they find their sources deep in the context of national interests and the 
power configuration of the international setting out of which they arise” (Claude 1984: 48). 
To understand the obstacles on the way to realize the ideal, we need to reveal underlying 
power relationship and its consequences through realist glasses.   
On the other hand, the normative aspect is an indispensable part of the reform process 
since both the history of international organizations and the reform at the UN shows us that 
change in the institutional settings are always a product of a compromise between some bold 
ideals and the constraints of the world politics. In this last reform drive what we observe is as 
a similar process. The reform initiative was first and foremost based on a realistic assessment 
of the current threats and challenges that the world faces. As a response to this fact, we see an 
apparent consensus, reached at the 2005 World Summit, over a number of fundamental 
concepts that the UN reform and the future of international politics will be based on. Thus, the 
normative aspect of this last reform drive was that both the reports and the Summit Outcome 
Document represent a broad consensus over the ways in which the institution ought to evolve. 
This consensus reflects the dual nature of change in international organizations. It brings 
together a realist interpretation of current challenges with an attempt to reform the UN with 
reference to the ideas which are present in the Charter that are neglected for a long time. This 
relationship between these two constituents has resulted in a policy proposal which aims to 
reform the institution in the direction of institutionalizing the concepts of “sovereignty as 
responsibility” and “human security”.  
Next challenge before understanding and studying the politics of change at the UN lies 
in the fact that mainstream theories of international relations are not capable of grasping the 
normative and realistic aspects of the reform process at the UN in the interrelated way they 
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work. To comprehend the process of change, we need a theory that can link realist and idealist 
streams of thought. The argument in the next chapter will be that the theoretical framework E. 
H. Carr introduces as “sound political thinking” brings realism and idealism into conversation 
with each other and explains the politics of change at the UN.  
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III 
THEORIZING REFORM AT THE UNITED NATIONS: A CONTROVERSY 
 
The manifest will embodied in the Reports of the Secretary General and the High-level 
Panel indicates the presence of a consensus on the fundamentals of the international politics 
and defines the concepts of “human security” and “sovereignty as responsibility” as both 
representative and compatible concepts to the UN Charter principles. Fundamental Charter 
principles, human rights, development and security, are reinterpreted in these documents 
opening the way to the idea of “human security” and “sovereignty as responsibility” to be the 
guiding principles for both reform at the UN and the future of the international polity.  
The evolution of the UN shows us how the process of institutional change at the UN 
works complex and unevenly. Main conclusions that Edward Luck (2004: 388-9) draws from 
the historical review of the UN reform are that reform does not come easily however the 
process of reform is constant. Generally, high-visibility initiatives come every five to seven 
years whereas less publicized change never cease. “At times, process seems more important 
than results, while at other times process is the desired result” and “change happens even if 
reforms doesn’t” (Luck 2004: 389-390). The lessons from the history of international 
organizations and the history of reform at the UN is that change in the institution is a process 
of give and take between normative and realistic aspects of politics.  
This processes and the politics of change in such processes are very poorly studied at 
the theoretical level in the literature. In this respect, the first aim of this chapter is to 
understand the reason why the discipline of international relations has not contributed to 
policy making in the area of institutional change. To this end, I first examine the neorealist 
and neoliberal institutionalist approach to international organizations with an attempt to assess 
their contribution to the study in international organizations as well as their shortcomings 
while trying to understand the UN reform process. Then, I move on to the discussion of 
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liberal internationalism in general and David Held’s model of “Cosmopolitan Democracy” in 
particular and their contribution to the study of politics of change at the UN. After evaluating 
each of these theoretical streams in their own terms, I will try to compare and contrast their 
respective contributions to our understanding of the current reform process at the UN. I argue 
that each of these perspectives has a lot to contribute to our understanding. However what we 
need is an approach that would bring the empirical knowledge brought by neorealist and 
neoliberal institutionalist research agenda and normative understanding that Held’s vision 
offers, into dialogue. The argument of the chapter is the theoretical framework Carr calls 
“sound political thinking” brings these perspectives together. In this respect, the second part 
of the chapter is devoted to outlining this alternative reading of Carr as a dialectician. On this 
part, I will first explain how Carr defines realism and idealism respectively and how he 
positions the two perspectives as dichotomies. The chapter concludes by presenting how Carr 
uses the dialectical relationship between realism and idealism as correcting each other 
perspective’s shortcomings and formulating a third alternative framework that he calls “sound 
political thinking”.  
 
3.1. The Study of International Organizations 
The study of international organizations in general and the United Nations in particular 
was not among the central research areas of the discipline of international relations especially 
in the Cold War period (Rochester 1986, Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). The debate of the 
1980s and 1990s centered on whether international institutions matter in altering state 
behavior and providing information for promoting cooperation under anarchy. This state-
centric approach sees international institutions as forums for interstate bargaining. 
International politics is marked by anarchy. It encourages actors to seek their interests and 
struggle for power, and therefore makes it hard to design institutional solutions to problems. 
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From this perspective designing institutions can be counterproductive or simply does not 
make sense. That can answer why the discipline of international relations has a poor record of 
contribution to the design of institutions while the debate over whether and how institutions 
matter in world politics occupied a great attention22. 
 
3.1.1. Neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approach  
The skeptical approach to institutions is marked by the realist tradition in international 
relations. The main aim of this strand is to understand the dynamics of international politics. 
The central research question in this stream is why do actors choose institutions to further 
their interests, why do institutions have the features they do? These questions were driving 
neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist research on institutions. These questions become 
irrelevant to understand the politics of institutional change in the UN reform process because 
this process is not motivated by particular interests of individual states but by a common 
interest perceived by the world society.  
Furthermore, both these theoretical perspectives are nor capable of conceptualizing the 
normative content of the reform process. Conventional theories of international relations do 
not consider the role of norms and institutions in the transformation of international politics 
important. They view underlying distribution of political and economic power as the main 
determinant in the equation. Institutions are seen as by-products of the relations of force or the 
relations of production. The explanation of the hegemonic stability theory of the extensive 
institutionalization in the international system is that hegemonic power creates institutions to 
legitimize its power (Keohane 1980, Stein 1983, Snidal 1985).  
One of the leading theoretical mainstreams in the discipline, neorealism, even 
dismisses the UN’s role in world politics entirely. Kenneth Waltz’s only comment in the 
                                                 
22 For a through review, please see Martin and Simmons 1998.  
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Theory of International Politics on the UN is that the institution has no regulatory role in the 
system because it simply reflects state interests (1979: 42, 164). International organizations 
according to neorealists play little or no role in maintaining international peace and security 
because international organizations rarely constrain state behavior in areas where interests are 
diverse and opposed. Mearsheimer reflects the neorealist position by saying “the most 
powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their 
share of world power, or even increase it.” Internationally, outcomes are “mainly a function of 
the balance of power” and institutions at best are “intervening variables” (1994/95: 13) 23.  
Although neoliberalism systematically studies the role of international institutions in 
world politics24, few neoliberal institutionalists have examined the UN’s potential 
contribution to international security, since they believed that the conditions under which 
institutions matter are not present particularly in the security area during the Cold War 
(Barnett, 1997: 528). However, like neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism too argues that 
international organizations rarely constrain state behavior in issues where interests are 
different and conflicting. Neoliberal institutionalism is broadly concerned with explaining 
how rational states under anarchy conditions can engage in cooperation and how institutions 
overcome barriers to cooperation by providing states mutual gain (Keohane 1984: 9, 51-2, 
Axelrod and Keohane 1993). In trying to explain change in the institutional design, neoliberal 
institutionalism conceptualizes a de-politicized forum in which states bargain over the 
distribution of gains while keeping account of the distributional histories providing to correct 
past discrepancies (Keohane 1984: 91, Martin 1992: 775-7). Accordingly, while the 
theoretical framework of neoliberal institutionalism is capable of analyzing how institutions 
change the incentives of actors in particular strategic environments, it is short of explaining 
                                                 
23 For other important realist approaches to institutions please see Schweller and Priess 1997, and Glaser 1994. 
24 There are also notable constructivist approaches to institutions, see Barnett and Finnemore 1999, March and 
Olsen 1998, Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986. Although constructivism provides a framework that explains change 
as an outcome of the continuous interaction among the members of society, constructivists in international 
relations have not yet managed to devise a theory with analytical specification.    
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the kind of change in the norms and institutions. When it comes to the issue of UN reform, 
neoliberal institutionalism can only say that international organizations foster cooperation 
between states in non-controversial issues where states have common interests. Thus, 
neoliberal institutionalism can explain what functions institutions can fulfill in international 
politics if there are common interests but they cannot explain how states come to realize that 
there are common interests and how to respond when common interest are realized and how 
to transform the institutional setting accordingly.  
Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism share more than their proponents would 
admit. Both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism depict institutions in strictly 
instrumental terms. In this respect, neorealist-neoliberal institutionalist debate is not an inter-
paradigm debate because they share an epistemology; focus on similar questions and 
assumption about international politics. Neoliberalism gives greater importance to the role of 
institutions, but their role in international politics is similarly functionally determined by 
political market failures in this case rather than power relations and paying little attention to 
the normative meanings of institutions25. While both neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism are useful in explaining the material conditions in which the politics of 
change takes place, they cannot conceptualize the normative dimension of the transformation 
process. 
 
3.1.2. Liberal internationalism and Held’s vision of a “Cosmopolitan Democracy” 
As opposed to the positivist approach of realist explanations to institutions in IR, from 
Kant onwards, liberal theorists have approached the issue of reform in the international 
relations from different angles focusing on normative as well as positive research agendas. 
Some have argued that the reform at the global level is necessary because of the progress 
                                                 
25 For a through critical review of the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist debate on institutions see Ruggie 
1998:1-44.  
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attained in economic relations, some argued for an escape from the anarchic structure of 
international politics. What was common to all was the idea that the current state of 
international politics is not acceptable and thus all argued for a change of the status quo. This 
conviction for reform is an identifying feature of the liberal tradition in international relations. 
And while the liberal tradition to international relations disagrees among themselves on a 
number of issues from the principle of non-intervention to the role of nationalism, they all 
agree on the need for reform of existing institutions26. At the international level, two of the 
plans for international organizations have been realized. Both the League of Nations and the 
United Nations have their philosophical origins in liberalism (Claude 1984: 78). Thus, as 
Smith (1995: 218) argues “despite frequent accusations of naiveté from realists, or of 
hypocrisy from Marxists, liberals have continually, and justifiably claim some success”.  
Although, the criticism directed towards liberal internationalists that the visions they create 
are utopian remains because they all address the question what international politics ought to 
be but they do not formulate strategies to achieve in the short term. 
As a normative theory of world order, liberal internationalism is concerned with how 
the system of states can be reformed with the aim of abolishing power politics and war (Long, 
1996). Internationalism is concerned with systemic transformation. However, there is 
disagreement over the kind of transformation, one envisaging the abolition of international 
anarchy and the establishment of world government, the other arguing for a gradual easing of 
international anarchy by the strengthening of international institutions (Bartelson 1995: 256).  
Liberal internationalism, which is the philosophical backbone of both the League of 
Nations and the United Nations, has also been regarded among the category of idealist stream.  
In the twentieth century, liberal-internationalist ideology has played a critical role in the 
design of historical world orders, in the aftermath of both the First and Second World Wars. 
                                                 
26 For a through review of liberal tradition and international reform please see Smith 1995: 201-24. 
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In the context of the post-Cold War, liberal-internationalist ideas have acquired a new 
strength (McGrew 2000: 409). The idea that not just nations themselves but relations between 
nations could also be democratic was revived in the mid-1990s. Annan draws our attention to 
the fact that it was almost unthinkable for the UN to take sides between democracy and 
dictatorship, or seeks to intervene in the internal affairs of its members in the past. However, 
“today, almost all UN members accept democratization as something desirable, at least in 
theory, and the UN itself does more than any other single organization to promote and 
strengthen democratic institutions and practices around the world” (Annan 2005). 
Some streams of liberal internationalism aim for institutionalizing democracy at the 
global level. David Held’s model of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’, which addresses 
contemporary problems of liberal democracy under conditions of globalization, is one of 
them.  His model is among the gradualist line. The argument of the model is that “national 
democracies require an international cosmopolitan democracy if they are to be sustained and 
developed in the contemporary era” (Held 1995: 23). The main aim of the model is to 
establish the condition for the realization of democratic autonomy, “an entitlement to 
autonomy within the constraints of community” (Held 1995: 156). Necessary condition is the 
establishment of a cosmopolitan democratic law that “transcends the particular claims of 
nations and states and extends to all in the universal community” (Held 1995: 228). 
The establishment of the cosmopolitan democracy at the global level requires that 
international organizations and the UN system be made more representative and accountable. 
To this end, a directly elected assembly of peoples which would form a second chamber 
would complement UN General Assembly. Regional forms of governance with regional 
parliaments would be developed. Cosmopolitan law also requires to be backed up by a 
coercive force which will be established through international and accountable military 
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forces. The institutions of the global economy would also be subject to democratic 
intervention.  
Held argues that contemporary globalization has already contributed to the 
transformation of the nature and future of democratic political community in the ways that the 
model of cosmopolitan democracy suggests. For example, the use effective political power is 
no longer in the monopoly of nation-states. Forces and agencies at national, regional and 
international levels share it. The development of EU has created intensive discussion about 
the future of sovereignty and autonomy within individual nation-states (Held 2000: 423-424). 
The essence of the cosmopolitan democracy is an attempt to identify the principles and 
institutions that would make the forms of power operating beyond the scope of democratic 
accountability.  
 
3.1.3. Two Perspectives in Dialogue 
Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism have the means to transform the reality 
since they have the theoretical tools to conceptualize the reality of world politics. They know 
the material that needs to be changed very well so they have the means to change. However, 
they cannot recognize the need for change in response to common challenges based on 
common interests and they do not ask the question of what ought to be. That is why; they do 
not have a vision that would guide the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist scholarship 
when it comes to policy making in the issue of reform at the UN. On the other hand, David 
Held has a well-developed vision of what the ideal state of international politics looks like and 
formulates a UN that would work in this environment.  However, he cannot tell us how that 
idea can be realized, cannot answer how we can get from here to there. What we need is a 
theoretical approach that would combine the respective strengths of these two perspectives, 
capable of conceptualizing both the practical and the normative content of politics of change.  
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The questions asked from both perspectives are relevant to the study of international 
organizations. The question is how to bridge the gap between the explanatory knowledge and 
normative approaches. As Wendt stated what is required for the study of institutional design is 
a knowledge that brings positive and normative inquiries into conversation with each other 
(2001: 1022-3). The dichotomy between positive and normative inquiries in its most basic 
form can be understood by understanding the relationship between realism and idealism.  
What brings these two aspects of the process of change together is the theoretical 
framework E. H. Carr introduces in the “Twenty Years’ Crisis”. Carr, in his seminal book, 
tried to accomplish one of the most challenging tasks of an international relations scholar: to 
conceptualize change in international politics at a time of constant change and uncertainty. 
His understanding of politics as a constant struggle between two forces, status quo and change 
(or reality and utopia) has far reaching implications for understanding contemporary world 
politics, which has similarities with the time Carr wrote. We are in a similar period of 
uncertainty in which a new order has not been yet established and we are having a hard time 
trying to conceptualize what will replace the Cold War system even after almost sixteen years 
after its demise because the process of transformation has not yet been finished.   
 
 
3.2.  E. H. Carr and the Concept of “Sound Political Thinking” 
 
It has been 67 years since Edward Hallett Carr wrote his book The Twenty Years 
Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (hereafter referred 
as Twenty Years’ Crisis). His work was and still remains to be highly influential on the 
literature of international relations theory. His work is considered to be one of the founding 
texts of the discipline of international relations in general and the realist school in 
international relations in particular.  The Twenty Years’ Crisis is a fruitful source of debate 
and controversy among IR scholars because some have argued that The Twenty Years’ is 
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flawed because the text shows Carr to have been confused as to where he stood in relation to 
utopianism and realism. He is recently started to be seen as the father of “critical approach” 
(Cox 1981). His increasing popularity has been related to the approval by the “post” 
movement as Kubalkova argues (1998: 27)27. Some have argued Carr’s work introduces more 
than Carr himself was consciously intended to accomplish28. Although there is a consensus 
over the continuing relevance of Carr’s work on international relations, there are a number of 
different Carr interpretations, sometimes complementary sometimes conflicting ones, at 
work29.  
However none of these scholars has considered the category Carr introduces as “sound 
political thinking” as a consistent third alternative to realism and utopianism that he 
criticizes30. The source of misunderstanding lies in the fact that people give attention to the 
parts of his work where he criticizes utopianism from a realist perspective and tend to 
overlook those parts where he criticizes realism from a utopian perspective. He uses both 
critiques to formulate a third standpoint in which realism corrects utopianism and utopianism 
corrects realism. The result is what he calls “sound political thinking” which is a third 
alternative to realism and utopianism.  
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Along with Cox 1981, Linklater 1997, Booth 1991, Linklater 1992, Howe 1994 and Jones 1996 have evaluated 
Carr’s work beyond the limits of realist interpretation. Each in their own way valued what is generally been 
considered as inconsistency and ambivalency in Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis. Their common point is that Carr’s 
reputation for realism distorts his relevance to contemporary debates (Linklater 1997, 321). For more on the 
secondary literature on Carr, please see Cox 2001. 
28 Linklater argues that Carr’s writings “contain a striking analysis of the changing nature of the modern state and 
the possibility of new forms of political association” (1997: 321). 
29 Jones analyzes some textbook definitions of realism to identify the extent that Carr was (seen to be) realist and 
concludes by saying “while Carr may meet some of the criteria of political realism he signally fails to meet 
others” (1998:4). He identifies his method as “Mannheimean social constructivist” which provides the possibility 
to build a ‘pragmatic liberalism’ (Jones 1998:11). 
30 Booth argues “The twenty years’ crisis is flawed because the text shows Carr to have been confused as to 
where he stood in relation to utopianism and realism” (1991: 530). 
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3.2.1. Carr as a dialectician31  
The “twenty years” Carr refers was the interwar period and the crisis he analyzes was 
a crisis stemming from a misunderstanding of the nature of the science of international 
politics. Carr (1942: 11) finds the science of international politics being “markedly and 
frankly utopian” at its initial stage32. On the one hand, he argues that in the interwar years, the 
end, which is the desire to prevent war, had prevented both policy-makers and academics of 
international politics from the acceptance of facts and the analysis of their causes and 
consequences (Carr 1942: 12-14). On the other hand, he also argues, “political thought itself 
is a form of political action. Political science is the science not only of what is, but of what 
ought to be” (Carr 1942: 7). These sentences put together represent a snapshot of what many 
believes as inconsistency in his writing. There is however no inconsistency because in the 
Twenty Years’ Crisis Carr takes a mid-standpoint towards realism and utopianism. He argues 
that both have their limitations but they are at the same time unavoidable in politics. He 
makes use of a number of oppositions between theory and practice, free will and determinism, 
the intellectual and the bureaucrat, left and right, ethics and politics to illustrate the dialectical 
relationship between the two. These repeated dichotomies serves Carr’s purpose to “create a 
science and to offer policy recommendations formed by a compromise between the two 
extremes” (Jones 1998: 130). 
According to Carr we need realism for two reasons: First, realism helps us to 
recognize that power is an essential element in international politics. He develops the realist 
arguments in his work by criticizing the liberal tradition that he finds dominating the interwar 
European politics and especially the belief that the establishment of the League of Nations 
meant the elimination of power from international politics (Carr 1942: 132). He argues that 
                                                 
31 Kubalkova (1998: 29) argues if one “rereads Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis with the help of dialectics”, one can 
see how he relates realism dialectically to idealism. 
32 The page numbers are from the 1942 printing of the first edition originally published in 1939.  
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formal equality and the participation of all members in the debates did not limit the role of 
power factor because important disputes cannot be solved without the agreement between the 
great powers (Carr 1942: 133). Referring to interwar years he says “It is profoundly 
misleading to represent the struggle between satisfied and dissatisfies Powers as a struggle 
between morality on one side and power on the other. It is a clash in which, whatever the 
moral issue, power politics are equally predominant on both sides” (Carr 1942: 135).  
The second reason Carr appreciates realism is the idea of relativity of thought in realist 
thinking is more important than recognizing the role of power in international politics. 
Relativity of thought reveals the relative and pragmatic character of thought that has 
demonstrated that intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism are products of 
circumstances and interests and not of absolute principles (1942: 87). He argues that the 
realist idea of relativity of thought must be used to “demolish the utopian concept of a fixed 
and absolute standard by which policies and actions can be judged” (Carr 1942: 96). He says:  
 
The realist has thus been enabled to demonstrate that the intellectual theories 
and ethical standards of utopianism, far from being the expression of 
absolute and a priori principles, are historically conditioned, being both 
products of circumstances and interests and weapons framed for the 
furtherance of interest (Carr 1942: 87). 
 
 
After outlining positive aspects of realist thinking, Carr goes on to explain limitations 
of realism. He criticizes realism from the idealist point of view. He is critical of the kind of 
realism that is deterministic: 
 
Representing a reaction against the wish-dreams of the initial stage, realism is 
liable to assume a critical and somewhat cynical aspect. In the field of thought, 
it places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their 
causes and consequences. It tends to depreciate the role of purpose and to 
maintain, explicitly or implicitly, that the function of thinking is to study a 
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sequence of events which it is powerless to influence or to alter. (Carr, 1942: 
14) 
 
 
He argues that realism is incapable of providing four essential features of political 
thinking: a finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment and a ground for 
action (Carr 1942: 113). In trying to explain what he meant by these principles he quotes 
Laski’s view that “communism has made its way by its idealism, and not by its realism, by 
its spiritual promise, not by its materialistic prospects” (quoted from Harold Laski’s 
Communism in Carr 1942: 115).   He goes on to explain that after demolishing the current 
utopia, which is a representation of the interests of the prevailing powers of the time, with the 
weapons of realism, we must built a new utopia which will be subject to the same weapons 
one day (Carr 1942: 118-9). In this case we need utopianism to think of alternatives to the 
dominant idea of the time33. Thus, what he proposes is to overcome the limitations of realism 
by utopian thinking. He says:  
 
… we cannot ultimately find a resting place in pure realism; for realism, 
though logically overwhelming, does not provide us with the springs of action 
which are necessary even to the pursuit of thought. Indeed, realism itself, if 
we attack it with its own weapons, often turns out in practice to be just as 
much conditioned as any other mode of thought (Carr 1942: 113). 
 
 
 
He then criticizes the kind of utopianism that is ignorant of the reality of international 
politics. This is where realism corrects this shortcoming of utopianism with providing us with 
the tools to understand the reality. He also says that the bankruptcy of utopianism is not in its 
inability to live up to its promises but its inability to form a disinterested standard for the 
                                                 
33 Carr thinks that only left, which he associates with utopianism, could think out principles of political action 
and evolves ideals for statesmen to aim at and that the political right is not able to create original political ideas 
(1942: 20).  
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conduct of international affairs (1942: 111). This critique reflects the realist idea of relativity 
of thought and realism helps us to reveal underlying interests.  
Carr’s massage is not complex if we understand that he “related realism dialectically 
to idealism” (Kubalkova 1998: 29). Kubalkova argues that if we understand the dialectical 
logic we can see how his advocacy of realism is “a transition, a station on the way” and 
“what was wrong with idealism is that it developed without realism” (1998: 29, 31). 
Dialectical reasoning works as realism corrects the excesses of idealism and idealism corrects 
the shortcomings of realism. Carr presents this dialectical relationship as “sound political 
thinking”: 
 
… any sound political thought must be based on elements of both utopia and 
reality. In international politics, post-War utopianism became a hollow and 
intolerable sham, which served merely as a disguise for the interests of the 
privileged powers; and the realist performs an indispensable service of unmasking 
it. But pure realism can offer us nothing but a naked struggle for power which 
makes any kind of international society impossible. Having demolished the 
current utopia with the weapons of realism, we still need to build a new utopia of 
our own, which will one day fall to the same weapons. …Here, then, is the 
complexity, the fascination and the tragedy of all political life. Politics are made 
up of two elements – utopia and reality – belonging to two different planes which 
can never meet. There is no greater barrier to clear political thinking than failure 
to distinguish between ideals, which are utopia, and institutions, which are reality. 
…The ideal, once it is embodied in an institution, ceases to be and ideal and 
becomes the expression of a selfish interest, which must be destroyed in the name 
of a new ideal. This constant interaction of irreconcilable forces is the stuff of 
politics. Every political situation contains mutually incompatible elements of 
utopia and reality, or morality and power. (Carr 1942: 118-9) 
 
 
In order to understand how the relationship between realism and idealism works we 
can examine the relationship between morality and power in Carr. He identifies two kinds of 
theory of international morality: on the one side there are realists who consider relations 
between states solely governed by power and that morality has no place. On the other side, 
there are utopians arguing for the existence of some code of morality between states as well as 
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individuals (1942: 194-5). He gives examples of international moral code for not to inflict 
unnecessary death or suffering on human beings, or violation of treaties, even frequently 
practiced, are condemned and felt to be a special case requiring special justification (Carr 
1942: 196-199). However he does not equate the ethical standards of individuals to that of the 
states. International morality has lower standards compared to individual morality because to 
Carr there is no means to compel states to behave morally similar to individuals’ feeling of 
conscience grows within a society. Logically he goes on to answer the question if there is an 
international community (1942: 204-6). His answer is “there is a world community for the 
reason (and for no other) that people talk, and within certain limits behave, as if there were a 
world community” (Carr 1942: 206). Therefore, international community exists because we 
think that it exists. 
However the existence of an international community does not necessarily mean that 
international morality is very strong. There is a dilemma between the sense of obligation to 
an international community and to one’s own country. That is why “in the international 
order, the role of power is greater and that of morality less” (Carr 1942: 213). He goes on to 
say: 
 
Any international moral order must rest on some hegemony of power. But this 
hegemony, like the supremacy of a ruling class within the state, is in itself a 
challenge to those who do not share it; and it must, if it is to survive, contain 
an element of give-and-take, of self-sacrifice on the part of those who have, 
which will render it tolerable to the other members of the world community. It 
is through this process of give-and-take, of willingness not to insist on all 
prerogatives of power, that morality finds its surest foothold in international – 
and perhaps national – politics. (Carr 1942: 213) 
 
 
He views this process of give-and-take as a strategy for the status quo powers to give 
concessions to the challengers. In the long run, challengers will not be satisfied with the 
continuation of the status quo. Carr argues that it is also the responsibility of the great powers 
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to make the changes in the system in an orderly way (1942: 213-5). Next, he goes on to 
examine problems of change in international politics and he argues that constant change and 
revision of rights is one of the most important characteristics of organized societies and in the 
realm of international society the most vital problem is to find alternatives to war in 
transforming these rights (Carr 1942: 263). The problem of peaceful change should be solved 
in such a way that bases “its operation not on power alone, but on that uneasy compromise 
between power and morality which is the foundation of all political life” (Carr 1942: 279). 
 
3.3. Theorizing the Politics of Change 
When it comes to the discussion of reform at the UN, the problem of peaceful change, 
both in theoretical and practical level also revolve around two streams of thought. On the one 
side there are realists who think UN as the institution in reality only a representative of the 
interests of the great powers of the time and thus do not give much energy to think about the 
future role of the institution. On the other side there are utopians who think that the UN 
represents something very distant to the ideal institution in their mind and thus blame the 
institution for not living up to its ideal premises. For both lines of thinking, it is important to 
note, “the ideal, once embodied in an institution, ceases to be an ideal and becomes the 
expression of a selfish interest, which must be destroyed in the name of a new ideal” (Carr 
1942: 119). It is not healthy to think that the UN as a representative of an ideal or the agent of 
the selfish interests of a minority. The constant interaction between the ideal and the 
institution (or reality) is what Carr (1942: 119) considers the essence of politics.  
If we take pure realism and pure idealism as ideal types and what Carr calls “sound 
political thinking” as the outcome of the dialectical relationship between these ideal types, 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism can be evaluated as standing somewhere near to 
pure realism. Not only they have all limitations of realism that Carr describes, they also lack 
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the most important contribution of realist thinking. Carr would say that the most significant 
shortcoming of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism reside not in their failure to help us 
understand and explain reality but in its inability to provide the realist critique that would 
reveal the relative character of thought.  
What is important here is their contribution to formulate a theoretical framework that 
has the capability to understand the politics of change at the UN. In this respect, contribution 
of neorealist thinking is its ability to explain the dynamics of contemporary world politics.34 
Neorealist understanding of the world politics helps us to see the structural constraints in 
terms of which actions are rewarded and which are punished in the system. Understanding of 
the world system as anarchic, and states as the unitary and rational actors seeking power-
maximization, neorealism shows us an important part of the reality35. We still see the rise of 
international institutions as a reality in world politics. Neoliberal institutionalism argues that 
this is so because international institutions carry out some functions that states are not 
capable of fulfilling. Moreover, neoliberalism can explain the durability of institutions 
despite changes in the circumstances. Institutions shape state preferences by forcing them 
into cooperative arrangements. States are rational actors and choose cooperation over 
conflict. New institutions can be created or existing ones can be reformed according to 
changing circumstances however neoliberal institutionalism cannot explain the 
transformation process itself. 
                                                 
34 Explaining world politics as outcomes of the characteristics of the system and structure, within the limits 
framed by stronger competitors in the system, itself can be subject to the realist critique of relativity of thought 
and be evaluated as being “both products of circumstances and interests and weapons framed for the furtherance 
of interest” by those actors which gain most from that structure (Carr 1942: 87). 
35 However, we need other theoretical approaches that challenge and try to show different aspects of the reality. 
Above all constructivist approaches and post-positivist approaches to international relations challenged and 
offered alternative explanations with regard to the system and the structure of international politics. Giving an 
account of the basic assumptions of these approaches is beyond the limits of this thesis.   
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Both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism has explanatory knowledge however 
they both lack the normative aspect which we need to have a viable plan, and a ground for 
action that would enable us to create a political vision.  In this respect, Held’s idea of 
“Cosmopolitan Democracy” represents the utopian thinking Carr describes. He creates a 
vision for the future of the international politics, however Held’s vision, just as Carr 
described as valid for all utopias, ignores the constraint of the reality of current world politics 
thus cannot formulate a viable policy to turn the utopia into reality. 
What we need here is to take both perspectives and use their power of correcting each 
other’s deficits as Carr does. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism being in the realist 
side and Held’s vision being in the utopian side of the picture, they can work in a dialectical 
relationship resulting in a sound political thinking. This way positive and normative research 
agenda will complement each other formulating a theoretical framework that has the capacity 
to explain the evolution of international organizations and recent reform initiative at the UN. 
This thesis has demonstrated that the manifest will to reform at the reports Secretary-
General and the High-level Panel and the consensus over the principles of reform embodied in 
the Summit Outcome Document exemplifies what Carr calls sound political thinking. These 
documents reflect the constant relationship between the two facets of politics by being a 
product of the compromise between an adjustment strategy of the institution to the necessities 
of the current world politics and reflection of some bold ideals. 
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  IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
The main problem with understanding the reform at the UN lies in the fact that some 
regard it impossible to achieve since the institution is only reflective of the existing power 
relations and some believe that it will always be short of the ideal model in their minds. 
These two perspectives also reflect the way theories of international relations conceptualize 
change in international politics in general and the reform at the UN in particular. The 
theoretical framework Carr puts forward in the “Twenty Years’ Crisis” reconciles idealist 
and realist perspectives and formulates a third standpoint.  
This thesis argued that last reform initiative at the UN in particular can best be 
conceptualized from the theoretical framework of E. H. Carr presents in the Twenty Years’ 
Crisis as “sound political thinking”. To Carr, every political situation contains elements of 
utopia and reality, of morality and power. He does not believe in an essential harmony. He 
believes in a constant struggle between the proponents of status quo and its enemies. Politics 
is the struggle between change and status quo. In the constant relationship between realism 
and utopianism, which makes up politics, sometimes utopian thinking veils our ability to 
understand and evaluate the constraints of reality. In that case, realist critique – the idea of 
relativity of thought – helps us to reveal underlying interests. And sometimes realist thinking 
leads us to determinism and inaction. In that case, we need utopianism to think of alternatives 
which will lead to political action. Sound political thinking rests on this constant relationship 
where utopia and reality keep correcting each other.  
We can say that the development of the concept of “human security” reflects that 
process. The idea of “human security” was based on the identification of some threats such as 
poverty, infectious diseases, environmental degradation, terrorism and international organized 
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crime. Thus, in the evolution of the concept, the point of departure was based on a realistic 
assessment of new challenges to security. According to traditional understanding of security 
these threats can be interpreted as being challenges to the survival of the state and thus 
become a security issue. However, the High-level Panel report does not assess these issues as 
threats because they threaten state security per se, but because they threaten the lives of the 
citizens in these states. This idea has gained momentum and started to be institutionalized in 
1990 through Security Council Resolutions, such as the one that considered starvation in 
Somalia as a collective security issue. This decision challenges the traditional notion of 
sovereignty and the traditional understanding of state security because it is in conflict with the 
idea of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the states. This process worked through a 
number of other cases and it became an established understanding that the idea of “human 
security” can be considered as a collective security issue, which surpasses the concept of 
sovereignty.  
This challenge to the absolute sovereignty has led to a new understanding of 
sovereignty, sovereignty as “responsibility to protect”. Linked to the “human security” 
concept, and as a result of the lessons learned from former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, 
Haiti, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone and Sudan, now it is becoming accepted that 
governments have the rights of sovereignty within their territorial borders as long as they can 
provide security and human rights to their citizens. This conditional sovereignty obliges the 
international community, that is to say other states to act if a state fails to fulfill its 
fundamental responsibilities to its citizens. 
In both cases, namely, the institutionalization of the concept of “human security” and 
“sovereignty as responsibility”, what we see is a process in which an ideal becomes a reality. 
In this process we observe incremental changes over time from state security to “human 
security”, from traditional understanding of sovereignty to conditional sovereignty. Each of 
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these new concepts was at one time an idea only, and in time they became institutionalized. 
In the process of change, realism enables us to see the constraints before materializing the 
idea, and the idea directs our policy by providing an ultimate goal. The resulting policy is 
neither the ideal getting institutionalized fully nor the reality remaining the same. We can 
understand this process of constant change by starting to think that contemporary state of 
international politics is neither a historical inevitability nor an ideal world.  
The view of peaceful change in Carr is not merely a resonance of utopian ideal to 
eliminate power from international politics and to base the bargaining process of peaceful 
change on a common feeling of what is just and reasonable. He draws our attention to the 
fact that realist view of peaceful change, which is a process of adjustment to the changed 
relations of power. In this process of adjustment, the party that is able to bring most power to 
bear emerges successful. He sees the successful achievement of peaceful change on the 
compromise between the utopian idea of a common feeling of right36 and the realist 
conception of a mechanical adjustment to a changed equilibrium of forces (Carr 1942: 283-
4).  
No single realist or idealist model appears to offer a complete explanation for the case 
of reform process. They do not develop satisfying explanations for design and change in 
international organizations. Admittedly, it is not easy to link realist and idealist explanations 
that would achieve theoretical precision beyond single case studies.  In order to make further 
progress in developing such a bridge-building theory, what we need to do is to test the model 
                                                 
36 Car refers to a “utopian conception of a common feeling of right” in the section named “the role of morality in 
political change” and he argues that in order to establish orderly procedures of peaceful change in international 
relations, there must be a certain measure of common feeling of what is just and reasonable in the mutual 
relations of the parties. He compares two cases of demands for change, one case between Ireland and Great 
Britain and the other between Germany and Great Britain. He argues that the chances of peaceful chance is more 
likely between Ireland and Great Britain because “the stock of common feeling between Great Britain and 
Ireland was considerably greater” which is necessary to have a certain readiness to sacrifice self-interest to the 
demand of home rule coming from Ireland. Eventhough the Anglo-Irish Treaty was concluded after a successful 
rebellion, it had its necessary moral foundation in the acceptance of a common standard of what is just and 
reasonable in mutual relations of the two countries (Carr 1942: 279-84).  The conception of a common feeling of 
right is utopian in the sense that it is not easy to establish the stock of common feeling on a global scale.  
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in other cases of institutional change. This would contribute both to identifying the prospects 
for reform and to exploring how elements of each approach might be combined to provide 
richer explanations for causes and processes of change in international organizations, 
including both institutional reform and change in organizational norms.  
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